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authority. Bolton and Jaenne (2011) advanced a model of contagion through
the banking system in nancially, but not scally, integrated unions.
In this paper we analyze the role of contagion risks and expectations of a
euro break-up in the dynamics of sovereign spreads over the period 2000-2013
in a number of euro-area countries. Our paper contributes to the literature
in two ways. We make use of an index of shadow exchange market pressure
derived in an earlier work (Canofari, Marini and Piersanti (CMP), 2012) to
measure investorsconcerns about EMU sustainability and contagion e¤ects
among euro-area countries. We test the power of this index vis-à-vis a broad
set of fundamentals found in the extant literature on EZ crisis.
The issue of whether a systemic risk is at play in the current wide dis-
persion of interest rates within the EMU showed up only very recently in
the literature. To the best of our knowledge, the rst to deal with this issue
is Eichler (2011). Using data from American Depositary Receipts (ADR)
stock market and analyzing their determinants, this paper nds some evi-
dence that investors added an exchange risk premium to ADR returns to
account for the risk that some vulnerable countries might leave the union
and reintroduce a new devalued national currency following the outbreak of
the crisis. Other papers dealing explicitly with the risk of a break-up of the
euro and its systemic consequences are Hui and Chung (2011), Di Cesare et
al. (2012), Klose and Weigert (2012), Favero (2013). Hui and Chung use
information on the dollar-euro currency option prices to estimate the euros
crash probability during the sovereign debt crisis of 2009-2010; Di Cesare et
al. nd that since July 2011 the risk of a euro break-up, approximated by
the Google-based indicator for this keyword, has been a major driver of the
3
instability of euro-area government bond markets; Klose and Weigert show
that interest rates spreads in the euro area are correlated with expectations
of a union breakdown derived from the virtual trading platform INTRADE.
Favero (2013) nds that expectations of exchange rate devaluation, captured
by the global European spreads, gained traction during the crises.
Except for Favero (2013), all these papers looked at the break-up issue
from a union-aggregate perspective, as their proxies for crash expectations
are from the EUR risk premium - that is, from markets expectations on the
stability of euro vis-à-vis the other major currencies - or from internet virtual
expectations. By contrast, we focus on the incentive to leave the euro and
hence to break up the union at the country level.
Using the concept of shadow exchange rate and a cost-benet analysis,
our paper adds to this strand of literature by providing a sustainability index
for currency unions that can be used to derive model-based expectations of
exit and of exchange rate change for each member countries, thus allowing
the systemic risk to be theory driven and consistently estimated2.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main events
surrounding the EZ crisis and the most recent literature. Section 3 presents
the empirical tests derived from a model of shadow exchange market pressure
in currency unions. Section 4 describes ndings. Section 5 concludes.
2Favero (2013), by contrast, models the euro break-up risk via the global euro area
spreads capturing the dependence of each countrys spread on all the other countries
spreads and scal fundamentals.
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2 Facts and literature review
The 10-year government bonds returns for "non-core countries" have seen a
rapid and persistent increase of spreads level and volatility in the period fol-
lowing the nancial crisis. The paths of these yields and di¤erentials against
the German Bund benchmark since 2000 are shown in Figures 1 and 2. Be-
tween 2000 and 2008 such returns and di¤erentials were virtually zero. After
the 2008 crisis government bond yields and spreads heightened considerably.
In particular, countries such as Greece, Ireland and Portugal experienced the
largest increase in their bond spreads, followed by Italy and Spain (Table
A1).
After the nancial crisis of 2008-09 there is a dramatic worsening of public
nances, spillover e¤ects across countries and markets, and economic reces-
sion that follow with the upsurge in the interest rates, as shown in Appendix
A (Tables A2-A4). Since 2008, economic growth plummeted whereas govern-
ment decits- and debt-to-GDP ratios rose to record levels in all countries
in spite of severe austerity measures taken by the European authorities and
national governments.3
Tensions emerged in bond markets and sovereign spreads widened in Sep-
tember 2008 in the wake of Lehman Brothers collapse and the announcement
of the bank rescue packages by Irish authorities. Tensions subsided and
3These include among other things: loan agreements and nancial support to dis-
tressed countries, the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a more active policy of supporting the price of
government debt securities through market purchases by ECB, strong austerity measures
implemented in the a¤ected countries by national policymakers.
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spreads started to decrease in the course of 2009 after the announcement of
strong budgetary austerity measures by the Irish government on February
2009. However, in November 2009 investorsconcern quickly turned to sov-
ereign default risk when the new Greek government revealed a revised budget
decit of 12.7% of GDP for 2009, which was twice as large as previously es-
timated. Since then, yield spreads started to rise considerably, triggering a
debt crisis in most countries and seriously challenging the EMU survival.
Existing studies on the determinants of government bond spreads inside
the euro area have identied a number of explanatory factors. Contributions
by Barrios et al. (2009), Haugh, Ollivaud and Turner (2009), Manganelli and
Wolswijk (2009), Sgherry and Zoli (2009), Gerlach, Schulz and Wol¤ (2010),
von Hagen, Schuknecht and Wolswijk (2011), for example, highlighted the
role of the global or common risk aversion, i.e. the attitude toward risk
of international investors. This e¤ect, typically measured by some index
of equity market volatility (e.g., the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX)) or the
US corporate bond spread, was found mostly important during the nancial
turbulence that followed the Lehman demise, when global risk repricing and
ight to more liquid and safe government bond markets favoured the German
Bund thus widening risk premium di¤erentials inside the EMU.
Other studies pointed out the role of country-specic risk factors captur-
ing the countrys creditworthiness or default risk (the so-called credit risk).
Papers by Barrios et al. (2009), Haugh, Ollivaud and Turner (2009), Attinasi,
Checherita and Nickel (2010), Amisano and Tristani (2011), Ejsing, Lemke
and Margaritov (2011), Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht (2012), Borgy
et al. (2012), Favero and Missale (2012), Aizenman, Hutchison and Jinjarak
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(2013), for example, found that the deterioration in public nances - mea-
sured by the debt (decit)-to-GDP ratio or by a countrys scal space - and
other macroeconomic and nancial fundamentals (e.g., GDP growth, current
account decit, fragility of domestic nancial system) played a signicant
role in the crisis. This e¤ect was prominent after the rise of the Greek scal
crisis and Germanys perceived reluctance to bailout Greece, when investors
started di¤erentiating between countriesscal solvency and macroeconomic
fundamentals.
Several papers also underlined the role of liquidity risk premium. Gomez-
Puig (2006), Barrios et al. (2009), Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009),
Haugh, Ollivaud and Turner (2009), Manganelli andWolswijk (2009), Favero,
Pagano and von Thadden (2010), for example, found that the liquidity e¤ect
(proxied by the share of a countrys debt in total EMU sovereign debt or
bid-ask spreads) was mostly relevant after the introduction of the euro and
during the period of high interest rates and stringent nancial conditions.
To summarize, the main insight we gain from this literature is that, at
least at low-frequency data, observed spread dynamics is driven by three
main factors: global risk aversion, country-specic risk and liquidity risk.4
These variables, however, cannot explain a signicant portion of sovereign
spreads movements occurred after 2010 (see, e.g., Ardagna et al., 2012; IMF,
2012; Di Cesare et al., 2012; Aizenman, Hutchison and Jinjarak, 2013; De
Grauwe and Ji, 2013). Caceres, Guzzo and Segoviano (2010), Arezki, Cande-
4Using high-frequency data, several papers have also shown the role of macroeconomic
news and rating announcements (see, e.g., Alfonso, Furceri and Gomez, 2011; Arezki,
Candelon and Sy, 2011; Arru et al., 2012; De Santis, 2012; Gärtner and Griesbach, 2012).
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lon and Sy (2011), Amisano and Tristani (2011), Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-
Rivero (2011), De Santis (2012), Metiu (2012), Giordano et al. (2013), for
example, found clear evidence of spillover e¤ects and nancial contagion from
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain to a large number of EMU countries.
Others argued that the unexplained part of spreads dynamics could reect a
new, systemic risk emerged since 2010: the risk of a euro break-up, that is,
the risk that one or more countries might exit from the EMU and introduce
new national currencies (see, e.g., Eichler, 2011; Hui and Chung, 2011; Di
Cesare et al., 2012; Woo and Vamvakidis, 2012; Klose and Weigert, 2012;
Favero, 2013).
To test for the presence of such risks in the interest spreads of non-core
countries, we make use of a novel synthetic index capable of measuring the
incentive to stay in or exit from a monetary union for each member country.
We review the theoretical foundations of our testing strategy and its empirical
implementation in the next two sections.
3 Theoretical framework
Our testing strategy builds around a model of voluntary exit and contagion
in monetary unions developed in an earlier paper (CMP, 2012). For con-
venience, we summarize the basic structure and solutions in Appendix C.
The model thinks of currency union as a (hard) system of xed exchange
rate where the probability of exiting is non zero. Exit follows from an opti-
mal choice by the policymaker and occurs when the di¤erence between the
costs and benets of staying in a monetary union exceeds a critical value.
9
Contagion follows from a broad set of channels transmitting monsoonal and
spillovere¤ects, and pure contagionacross member countries. A key insight
to be gained from this model is that the sustainability of a currency union can
be assessed by a synthetic index capable of monitoring the costs and benets
of staying in for each member country. This results from the following two
equations, obtained as a solution of an asymmetric three-country monetary
union model consisting of a coreor leader country and two non-coreor
peripheryeconomies (A and B):5
sit   si =  
i
2i + 
i

yi;Ft   yi

; (1)
@it
@jt
= G
 
uit+1
 sjt+1 = sjt) G  uit+1 sjt+1 = sjt + j) > 0 ; i; j 2 fA;Bg i 6= j;
(2)
where all variables are country-specic, measured in logs and
s = nominal (shadow) exchange rate
s = entry currency parity
 = elasticity of (aggregate) demand to the real exchange rate
 = ination aversion coe¢ cient
yF = real output required to stay in the union
y = output target
t = expected exit probability
u = threshold value of random (demand) shock
 = devaluation size conditional on exit from the union.
Equation (1) gives country i optimal regime-switching condition measur-
ing the welfare losses arising from alternative policy regimes. It expresses
5See Appendix C.
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the policymakers switching rule as a linear relationship between the shadow
devaluation rate (sit   si) and the output gap

yi;Ft   yi

required to remain
in the monetary union.6 Condition (1) can also be written as
sit   si  Ci;
where Ci denotes the critical devaluation rate such that the welfare losses
arising from staying in or opting out of the union are exactly the same.7
This equation states that the policymaker will optimally choose to exit and
devalue when the shadow exchange rate exceeds the entry parity by the
critical value Ci, that is, when a random shock greater than a critical value
occurs.8
Equation (2) highlights that private agentsexpectations in di¤erent coun-
tries are not independent in the model. It computes the e¤ect on the expected
exit probability for country i of a change in the perceived probability of exit
in country j (j 6= i). This equation implies that a rise in jt can push the exit
probability in country i high enough that an opting out choice can hardly be
avoided, thus modelling a powerful mechanism by which nancial instability
6See, also, Cavallari and Corsetti (2000), Berger and Wagner (2005). In our model, we
think of the shadow exchange rate as the oating rate that would prevail at any date t in
country i conditional on exit from the monetary union. The key role this variable plays
in the theory of exchange rate crises can be found in Piersanti (2012).
7Formally,
sit   si = Ci =) $i;Ft  $i;Dt = 0 ;
where $i;Ft and $
i;D
t are the losses country i runs to when choosing whether to stay in or
exit from the currency union, respectively.
8See Appendix C.
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can become so widespread that a crisis reaches systemic dimensions. Fear of
a crisis and exit in one country can spread to other countries, making the
union crash more likely to occur.
Equations (1) and (2) are key to our empirical investigation as they enable
us to distinguish the euro break-up risk and contagion risk from the other
risk factors emphasized in the extant literature. We proceed to discuss their
empirical implementation below.
4 Empirical modelling and results
In CMP (2012) we used equation (1) to derive an index of sustainability of
currency unions that can evaluate the vulnerability of member countries to
speculative attacks and crisis. The index is intended to act as an e¤ective
early warning signal of countries under stressand hence of the potential of a
crisis when a threshold value is crossed. Observing that equation (1) gives the
expected shadow devaluation rate for country i conditional on exit from the
monetary union, the view we take in this study is to use it as the theoretical
relationship of the way markets concern about the risk of a euro break-up
could be measured. After all, the evidence that the divergence of sovereign
bond returns from their fair value(i.e., the value consistent with country-
specic macroeconomic and nancial fundamentals) is negative for some
core countries and positive for non-core countriesis likely to be ascribed to
the expectation that a break-up of the euro would entail an appreciation of
the new national currencies for the former countries and a depreciation for
12
the latter, compared with the parities enshrined in the single currency.9
We also use equation (2) as the theoretical relationship for estimating
contagion e¤ects, since it models how changes in exit expectations for one
country can spread to other countries so propagating instability and systemic
risk in currency unions. Details on the empirical implementation of these
variables are given further on.
The baseline model specication we used in the empirical investigation is
as follows
Iit = b
0Xt + "it ; (3)
where Iit is the spread between the 10-year government bond yield in coun-
try i and the German Bund benchmark in period t, "it a standard error
term, and Xt a vector of explanatory variables. The set of variables in Xt
includes: global risk aversion, measured by the spread between the yields
on US corporate bonds and US treasury bills or the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX); sovereign solvency risk, measured
by a countrys scal space or government debt and budget balance to GDP
ratios;10 liquidity risk, captured by the ratio of a countrys outstanding gen-
eral government debt to euro-area-wide total; and variables proxing market
9Di Cesare et al. (2012), p. 5. See also Eichler (2011), Klose and Weigert (2012),
Favero (2013).
10Our measure of scal space is from Aizenman and Jinjarak (2010). They propose the
concept of de facto scal space, dened as the ratio between the outstanding public debt
and the de facto tax base, where the latter measures the realized tax collection, averaged
across several years to smooth for business cycle. It is argued that this is a better measure
of debt sustainability than the debt-to-GDP ratio. See, also, Aizenman, Hutchison and
Jinjarak (2013) and De Grauwe and Ji (2013).
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condence about EMU survival and contagion e¤ects as shown below. We
expect a positive sign for global risk aversion, solvency risk and markets
concern about a euro break-up and negative sign for liquidity risk.
In the sequel we follow a two-stage investigation strategy. In the rst
stage we take no account of contagion e¤ects and focus on the relevance
of euro break-up expectations vis-á-vis macroeconomic fundamentals. In the
second stage we focus on contagion e¤ects in an empirical model that strictly
follows from equation (2).
The euro break-up risk and the macro indicators. As stressed
in section 3, our indicator of the euro break-up risk follows directly from
equation (1), which is shown to include: the nominal xed parity (s), the
elasticity of aggregate demand to the real exchange rate (), the output gap 
yFt   y

, and the ination aversion coe¢ cient (). Hence, we need estimates
of  and of yFt   y, and to set values for s and  in order to compute the
shadow devaluation rate for each country capturing market expectations of
a euro collapse.
We relied on estimates provided by CMP (2012) for EZ countries over
the period 1980Q1-2010Q3 for  and . We used the Hodrick-Prescott lter
to obtain estimates of potential output and of output gap for each country.
We made use of Euro o¢ cial xed conversion rates to set values for si. We
nally computed the expected (shadow) devaluation rate for each country
(sri  s^i   si) as
s^it = s
i   aiy^it; ai 
^i
^2i + ^
; y^it  yit   y;
where hat variables are estimates and yit   y is the output gap. The paths of
14
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Figure 3: Shadow Spreads
the shadow devaluation rate di¤erentials against the German rate
 
dsri  sri   srGER
since 2000 are shown in Figure 3. During the crisis period an impressive sim-
ilarity with the dynamics of sovereign bond spreads emerges: since 2009
both the devaluation rate di¤erentials and the interest rate spreads in non-
core countries move upward, with Greece, Ireland and Portugal showing the
largest increase.
Tables A5 and A6 present some preliminary Panel Least Squares esti-
mates of equation (3) for the period 2000Q1-2012Q2 and the two sub-periods
labelled as pre-crisis period (2000Q1-2007Q4) and crisis period (2008Q1-
2012Q2).11 We used the sample period 2000Q1-2012Q2 for estimation and
the period 2012Q3-2013Q1 for out-of-sample testing.
11In the literature, the onset of the crisis is generally accepted to be towards the end of
2007.
15
Table A5 shows that interest rate spreads react to both market condence
about euro survival and macroeconomic fundamentals. However, the (very)
low DW statistics indicates that we cannot dismiss the hypothesis of spurious
regressions, as the results in Tab. A6 plainly reveal.12 The high degree of
persistency in sovereign spreads data, therefore, prompt us to check rst for
the order of integration and then for a long-run or cointegrating equation
among the variables of interest.
We assessed the stationarity and cointegration properties of the data set
through a battery of panel unit root and cointegration tests that we show
in tables A7 and A8. The tests statistics and their p values sharply indicate
that yield spreads, scal space, liquidity, global uncertainty and shadow de-
valuation rate are I(1) and that we cannot reject the hypothesis that these
variables are cointegrated. Causality tests using VEC modelling also show
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that interest spreads are Granger-caused
by shadow rates (see, Tab. A9).
The estimated long-run or cointegrated relationships are shown in Table
I below.13
12To save space, in tables A5-A6 we report only the results when the di¤erentials between
the shadow devaluation rate (dsr) and the scal space (dfs) in country i and the benchmark
country, and the US corporate bond spread (cbs) are included in the set of regressors. An
absolutely similar picture emerges, however, when the debt- or the budget decit-to-GDP
ratio for each country, and the CBOE Volatility Index appear in the regressor vector Xt.
Results are available upon request.
13Similar results are obtained when the CBOE Volatility Index is in the set of regressors
in lieu of the US corporate bond spread index. They are available upon request.
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Table I Long-run equilibrium relationship
Sample period: 2000Q1 2012Q2
ist = 14:120dsrt   0:001dfst + 0:061liqt   0:001cbst
(7:045) (0:107) (0:883) (0:268)
Pre-crisis period: 2000Q1 2007Q4
ist = 0:123dsrt + 0:001dfst + 0:003liqt + 0:001cbst
(1:562) (3:531) (1:884) (11:410)
Crisis period: 2008Q1 2012Q2
ist = 12:350dsrt + 0:030dfst   0:195liqt + 0:029cbst
(7:873) (3:891) (2:175) (5:394)
Note: A complete description of variables is in
Appendix A, Table A5. t-tests in parentheses
Two relevant points follow from this model estimation. The rst is that a
long-run solution between bond yield spreads and the variables appearing in
the vector of regressors Xt manifestly exists. The second is that this relation-
ship is not stable but split in two distinct sub-periods: the period preceding
the global nancial crisis (2000-2007), when all the explanatory variables
played a marginal or no role; the period following the crisis (2008-2012),
when the chosen variables acquired a prominent relevance.14 In particular,
we nd that before the crisis markets did not perceived any visible risk in
the peripheral countriessovereign debt, as the signicant but low value of
14The discontinuity in the role of various determinants of spreads is also found, for
example, in Barrios et al. (2009), Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2011), Arghyrou and
Kontonikas (2012), Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2012), De Grauwe and Ji (2013), Favero
(2013), Giordano et al. (2013).
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coe¢ cient on the scal space variable highlights. As a result, markets priced
the default risk in non-core countries in the same way as the risk of core coun-
tries, which means that they looked at the EMU as a fully credible monetary
union where the probability to exit is zero. The (perceived) low level of
credit risk and of global uncertainty and the disappearance of the exchange
rate risk since the inception of euro then explain the stability of long-term
government bond yields di¤erentials at very low levels in this phase.
By contrast, after the crisis we nd that the abnormal increase in the
spreads of the peripheral countries can be traced back to the marked shift
in both the pricing and the amount of the perceived risk associated with
investment in EMU government bonds. Investors condence in the irre-
versibility of the euro loosened and markets started looking at the EMU as
a system of xed exchange rates involving the risk of exchange rate realign-
ments. Specically, the increase in global risk aversion after the US subprime
crises and the perceived reluctance of EU governments to bail out countries
facing a sovereign debt crisis led markets to reprice the international risk
factor and macroeconomic fundamentals on a country-by-country basis, as
the high statistical signicance and size of coe¢ cients associated with the
countys scal space (dfs), liquidity premium (liq), and global uncertainty
(cbs) openly show. Yet, the most striking result to emerge from these esti-
mates is the notable relevance of markets expectations of countriesexit from
the European Monetary Union and hence of expectations of a euro break-up
(dsr). It visibly discloses that not only country-specic and international
risk factors but also the perceived reluctance of EU governments to x the
monetary union in a political union were critical determinants of the deep
18
out-of-the-money euro put option prices, which embedded information on the
euro crash risk during the sovereign debt crisis(Hui and Chung, 2011).15
Simple tests of the forecasting performance of the estimated VEC model
are shown in Fig. 4. The Figure reports for each country static simulations
of the model during the nancial crisis period. We used the period 2008Q1-
2012Q2 for estimation, we then conducted out-of-sample simulations over
the period 2012Q3-2013Q116. Overall, we can observe that the model has
a signicant ability to correctly forecast the dynamics of spreads (i.e., the
change in the interest di¤erentials) in all the countries. Of relevance is its
(out-of-sample) ability to correctly forecast the resolution phase of the crisis
which started in August 2012 after the launch of the OMT by ECB.
15On this point see also Eichler (2011), Financial Times (2012), Di Cesare et al. (2012),
Draghi (2012), Woo and Vamvakidis (2012), Klose and Weigert (2012), Favero (2013).
16The estimated VEC equation is shown in Table A12.
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Figure 4: Changes in Interest Spreads (ist = ist   ist 1)
Average RMSE: in sample 0.77; out of sample 1.49
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To better understand the role played by each factor during the crisis, we
also computed the relative contribution of each regressor to the changes in
sovereign yield spreads (see Table II). As in Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz
(2009) and Attinasi, Checherita and Nickel (2010), these gures were com-
puted as the ratio between the absolute value of the contribution of each
variable, measured as the product between the average value of that variable
across time and its estimated coe¢ cient, and the sum of the absolute value
of the contributions of all (statistically signicant) variables in the model.
For example, the relative contribution of the dsr variable (Cdsr) is computed
as
Cdsr =
j ^1
 
dsrt
 j
j ^1
 
dsrt
 j + j ^2  dfst j + j ^3  liqt j + j ^4  cbst j ;
where ^i (i = 1; 2; 3; 4) is the coe¢ cient estimate from table I (e.g., 12:350
for dsr) and (xt) is the average value over time of the (generic) regressor x.
A run-through of table II shows that, for the whole panel and all coun-
tries, global risk aversion made up the majority of the sovereign yield spread
during the nancial turbulence period of 2009-2012, with scal position, liq-
uidity and expectations of a EMU break-up playing a substantially smaller
role. Yet, a di¤erent picture emerges when we split the euro-area debt cri-
sis in the three phases marked by (i) the explosion of the Greek debt crisis
(2009Q1-2010Q4); (ii) tensions on government bond markets of Spain and
Italy (2011Q1-2012Q2); (iii) the launch of government bond-buying pro-
gramme (OMT) by ECB (2012Q3-2013Q1). We nd that:
 the relative contribution of the euro break-up risk changed over time
in each country consistently with the change in nancial stress;
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 during the most acute phases, both risk aversion and expectations of
countries exit from the monetary union played the major role, with the
latter being the most relevant in the case of Greece17.
Hence, the perceived risk of a break-up of the euro area by private agents
do appear to have been a key driver of spreads during the phase of excep-
tionally high volatility in nancial markets.
17These results replicate those found in the literature using other indicators of the
break-up risk (see, e.g., Di Cesare et al., 2012; Klose and Weigert, 2012; Favero, 2013).
In particular, it is striking to see the similarity with the results derived from the on line
betting platform INTRADE, which (much like our indicator) captures the perceived risk of
a countrys withdrawal from the currency union by market participants (See Chart 19612
in Klose and Weigert, 2012).
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Table II Relative contributions of explanatory variables (%)
2009Q1 2012Q2 2009Q1 2010Q4
Country dsr dfs liq cbs dsr dfs liq cbs
Italy 1.73 5.88 17.52 74.86 3.68 20.44 31.40 44.48
Spain 8.98 20.29 3.39 67.34 21.46 8.70 12.65 57.19
Ireland 20,95 16.88 3.47 58.70 29.94 5.83 2.79 61.44
Portugal 8.43 42.06 5.17 44.33 44.48 9.24 2.46 43.82
Greece 7.45 41.43 5.89 45.23 42.36 26.14 3.37 28.13
Panel Average 7.25 21.94 13.19 57.61 31.07 13.83 10.29 44.81
2011Q1 2012Q2 2012Q3 2013Q1
Country dsr dfs liq cbs dsr dfs liq cbs
Italy 7.86 18.85 29.01 44.28 13.01 19.64 26.62 40.73
Spain 30.54 1.12 13.73 54.60 20.75 11.84 14.95 52.46
Ireland 17.35 29.25 2.88 50.51 7.21 42.50 3.02 47.27
Portugal 27.00 19.98 1.96 51.06 22.77 26.29 3.19 47.75
Greece 43.65 26.32 3.04 26.99 29.30 30.84 3.58 36.28
Panel Average 27.21 20.40 9.72 42.66 15.28 33.72 9.66 41.34
Contagion and systemic risk. We now turn to the critical issue of
contagion e¤ects across EMU countries. Specically, we focus on a key ques-
tion raised by our theoretical model: to what extend the dramatic increase
in the spreads is an instance of propagation of a systemic risk following in-
creasing doubts about the irreversibility of the euro and fears of a Greek exit
from the monetary union by markets participants.
In order to inquire into this matter, we focused on equation (2) which
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models how expectations of a crisis and exit in one country can spread to
other countries and become so widespread that a systemic crisis can hardly
be avoided. We brought to the data a simple empirical specication of (2)
such as: fdsrt = a0 + a1dsrGREt ;
where fdsrt now excludes the Greek shadow devaluation rate di¤erential 
dsrGREt

used as regressor to measure contagion. Estimation results over the
period 2008Q1-2012Q2, obtained using cointegration technics to identify the
plausible long-run relationship, are as follows (unit root and cointegration
tests are in Appendix A, Table A10):
fdsrt = 0:001 + 0:198dsrGREt
(0:006) (2:295)
.
The estimates show that contagion from the Greek nancial crisis and
expected exit from the euro area do appear to have occurred in the other
countries since the coe¢ cient associated with the Greek shadow devaluation
rate is positive and signicant. The relative impact of dsrGRE on the variation
in the shadow devaluation rates of the other peripheral EU countries is far
from being negligible, ranging from a worthy 34% over the period 2009-2012
to an impressive 61% or even 78% over the periods 2009-2010 and 2011-2012,
respectively.
The strong interdependence between European countries led us to search
also for a long-run equilibrium relationship between each non-core country
and the other four countries. But the results of cointegration tests (not
reported here to save space and available upon request) rejected a long-run
solution between them.
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To further assess the capability of the shadow exchange rate index to
capture the systemic risk or systemic element of the crisis we applied the
principal component analysis. The evidence reported in Table 11 shows that
the correlation among the expected devaluation rates is high, and that the
rst principal component explains 78% of the total variation, while the second
accounts for 16% of the total. The rst two components thus account for 94%
of the total variation. This conrms the results of the regression analysis
presented above and suggests that the index is measuring the system risk
which was behind the redenomination risk discussed by the ECB-President
Mario Draghi.
Hence, our paper provides strong empirical support to the view that the
increasing loss of condence in the stability of the euro area and expectations
of a EMU break-up have been key drivers of sovereign spreads dynamics in
the euro zone.
These ndings are strongly consistent with the main implication of our
theoretical model, which predicts that in a monetary union nancial instabil-
ity can be transmitted through changes in exit expectations and devaluations
of its member countries, thus foreshadowing the occurrence of a union break-
up eventually.
5 Conclusion
This paper has focused on the role the perceived risk of a euro break-up and
its systemic consequences played in widening government bond yield di¤er-
entials across EZ countries. To investigate this issue, we used a simple model
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of voluntary exit and contagion e¤ects in monetary unions that combines
the best features of both rst and second generation approaches to currency
crises. The model allows to extract a sustainability index for currency unions
that we used as a proxy for market expectations of a euro break-up in the
empirical analysis of spreads dynamics in non-core EZ countries.
Using quarterly data and panel estimation techniques to model the spreads
of 10-year sovereign bond yields over the German Bund benchmark in the
Euro Zone over the period 2000Q1-2012Q2, we found that even controlling for
country-specic and global risk factors, fears of a reversibility of the euro and
contagion from Greece were fundamentals drivers of sovereign risk premia in
non-core countries.
These ndings have important policy implications. If price dynamics in
government bond market is largely driven by market sentiment then some
form of ECB intervention or mutual guarantee over public debt (e.g., Eu-
robonds) with the explicit goal of correcting mispricing by markets can be
economically justied (see, for a discussion, Favero and Missale, 2012).
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Appendix A - Tables
Table A1 Long-term sovereign yield spreads: descriptive statistic (2008-2012)
2008Q2 - 2012Q2 2011Q2 - 2012Q2
Country mean max min st.dv. mean max min st.dv.
Portugal 401.31 1139.00 45.00 393.69 953.33 1139.00 680.00 171.69
Ireland 357.90 791.67 390.00 252.13 658.60 791.67 537.67 112.60
Italy 184.63 468.00 52.73 132.80 357.40 468.00 171.00 117.64
Greece 796.84 2398.00 56.33 770.10 1814.73 2398.00 1240.00 512.88
Spain 175.53 474.67 26.00 133.86 346.33 474.67 228.00 89.62
Yield spreads are expressed in basis points. Source: See Appendix B
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Table A2 Real GDP growth
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Portugal 2.365 -0 .009 -2 .908 1.401 -1 .669 -3 .005
Ireland 5.445 -2 .109 -5 .456 -0 .766 1.431 0.353
Italy 1.683 -1 .156 -5 .494 1.804 0.400 -2 .100
Greece 2.996 -0 .157 -3 .250 -3 .517 -6 .906 -6 .000
Spain 3.479 0.893 -3 .742 -0 .322 0.400 -1 .400
Germany 3.388 0.802 -5 .073 4.024 3.100 0.900
*Forecast. Source: World Economic Outlook
Table A3 Government Budget Decit/GDP ratio
Country 2000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Portugal -3 .313 -3 .212 -3 .697 -10.169 -9 .843 -4 .239 -4 .990
Ireland 4.687 0.062 -7 .340 -13.931 -30.946 -12.752 -8 .301
Italy -0 .911 -1 .590 -2 .673 -5 .368 -4 .475 -3 .822 -2 .725
Greece -3 .734 -6 .801 -9 .912 -15.561 -10.496 -9 .113 -7 .519
Spain -0 .997 1.904 -4 .152 -11.193 -9 .365 -8 .931 -6 .993
Germany 1.323 0.237 -0 .057 -3 .212 -4 .144 -0 .781 -0 .389
*Forecast. Source: World Economic Outlook
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Table A4 Government Debt/GDP ratio
Country 2000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Portugal 48.359 68.262 71.582 83.051 93.320 107.818 119.066
Ireland 37.493 24.988 44.489 64.859 92.175 106.460 117.743
Italy 108.475 103.082 105.749 115.992 118.605 120.102 126.332
Greece 103.441 107.448 112.622 128.952 144.550 165.412 170.731
Spain 59.379 36.301 40.172 53.917 61.316 69.117 90.693
Germany 60.182 65.355 66.911 74.719 82.394 80.555 83.038
*Forecast. Source: World Economic Outlook
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Table A5 Panel Least Squares estimates: 10-year government bond yield
spreads over Germany (is)
Sample period: 2000Q1 2012Q2
ist= 3:081 + 3:235dsrt+ 0:045dfst 0:726liqt+0:007cbst
(1:967) (5:961) (7:532) (3:158) (1:981)
R
2
= 0:402; SE = 2:504; DW = 0:181; FE = 0:000
Pre-crisis period: 2000Q1 2007Q4
ist= 1:019 + 0:049dsrt+0:003dfst 0:156liqt+0:001cbst
(4:823) (0:988) (5:493) (4:701) (3:335)
R
2
= 0:590; SE = 0:104; DW = 0:241; FE = 0:000
Crisis period: 2008Q1 2012Q2
ist= 3:880 + 5:756dsrt+0:052dfst 1:377liqt+0:030cbst
(1:191) (8:167) (5:500) (3:154) (2:770)
R
2
= 0:670; SE = 2:742; DW = 0:517; FE = 0:044
Note: All the data are expressed in percentages. The panel members
include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. dsr = Shadow deva-
luation rate di¤erential over Germany; dfs = Fiscal space di¤erential
over Germany; liq = Ratio of government debt to euro-area-wide total;
cbs = US corporate bond spread; R
2
= Adjusted R2; SE = Standard error
of regression; DW = Durbin Watson statistic; FE = Redundant xed e¤ects
test (p-value); t statistics in parentheses. A complete description of data
sources is in Appendix B.
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Table A6 Panel Least Squares estimates: 10-year government bond yield
spreads over Germany (is)
Sample period: 2000Q1 2012Q2
ist=  0:254 + 1:132ist 1+0:065dsrt 0:002dfst+0:031liqt+0:001cbst
(0:684)(64:643) (0:473) (1:350) (0:569) (1:245)
R
2
= 0:968; SE = 0:584; DW = 1:526; FE = 0:400
Pre-crisis period: 2000Q1 2007Q4
ist= 0:145 + 0:842ist 1+0:037dsrt+0:001dfst 0:017liqt 0:000cbst
(1:572) (23:431) (1:734) (2:041) (1:179) (1:910)
R
2
= 0:926; SE = 0:042; DW = 1:735; FE = 0:353
Crisis period: 2008Q1 2012Q2
ist= 0:412 + 1:045ist 1+0:632dsrt 0:000dfst 0:100liqt+0:003cbst
(0:367) (24:753) (1:990) (0:074) (0:638) (0:893)
R
2
= 0:962; SE = 0:937; DW = 1:661; FE = 0:275
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Table A7 Panel Unit Root Tests (p-value)
Sample period: 2000Q1 2012Q2
Level 1st di¤erence
LLC F-ADF F-PP LLC F-ADF F-PP
is 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
dsr 0.975 0.203 0.258 0.000 0.000 0.000
dfs 1.000 0.998 0.437 0.004 0.002 0.000
liq 0.945 0.992 0.918 0.005 0.016 0.000
cbs 0.918 0.923 0.905 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Null hypothesis= unit root. LLC= Levin, Lin,
and Chu test (common unit root process); F-ADF
and F-PP= Fisher-ADF and Fisher-PP tests (indivi-
dual unit root process). The test on the level inclu-
des individual xed e¤ects (intercepts and trends);
the test on 1st di¤erence includes no deterministic
component. Maximum number of lags xed at 3.
Table A8 Panel cointegration tests (p-value)
Sample period: 2000Q1 2012Q2
No. CE None At most 1 At most 2 At most 3 At most 4
J-F test 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.274 0.125
Kao test 0.001
Note: None, At most 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote the number of cointegra-
ted equations (No. CE) under the J-F test. J-F test= Johansen-
Fisher cointegration test. Null hypothesis for Kao cointegration
test= No cointegration. Maximum number of lags xed at 3.
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Table A9 Causality tests
Sample period: 2000Q1 2012Q2
Null Hypothesis p-value
dsr does not Granger cause is 0.0002
is does not Granger cause dsr 0.1489
Table A10 Panel Tests (p-value)
Sample period: 2008Q1 2012Q2
Unit root Cointegration
Level 1st di¤erence No. CE None 1
LLC F-ADF F-PP LLC F-ADF F-PP J-F test 0.028 0.913fdsr 0.821 0.933 0.959 0.000 0.002 0.000 Kao test 0.003
dsrGRE 0.057 0.702 0.984 0.000 0.021 0.000
Note: 1= At most 1. Maximum number of lags xed at 2. For other label names see
Tables A7 and A8. Analogous results are obtained if the tests are carried out over
the period 2000Q1-2012Q2 .
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Table 11 Principal Component Analysis
Ordinary correlations
dsrGRE dsrIR dsrPT dsrES dsrIT
dsrGRE 1.000
dsrIR 0.771 1.000
dsrPT 0.972 0.798 1.000
dsrES 0.858 0.964 0.867 1.000
dsrIT 0.512 0.298 0.592 0.437 1.000
Components
No. Cumulative ratio
1 0.782
2 0.942
3 0.992
4 0.998
5 1.000
Table 12 VEC estimates: Sample 2008Q1 2012Q2
Eq.: isit = 1isit 1 + 2isit 2 + 3dsrit 1 + 4dsrit 2 + 5dfsit 1
+6dfsit 2+7liqit 1+8liqit 2+9cbsit 1+10cbsit 2+11ecit 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0.617 -0 .055 1.005 0.381 0.027 -0 .003 -0 .237 .482 -0 .300 -0 .002 -0 .049
(5.124) (0 .408) (2 .038) (0 .858) (2 .971) (0 .238) (0 .424) (0 .872) (0 .663) (0 .388) (1 .750)
R2 = 0.341 SE = 0.855
ecit 1 isit 1 12:350dsrit 1  0:030dfsit 1+0:195liqit 1 0:029cbsit 1
t statistics in parentheses
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Appendix B Data Sources
Variables name: 10-yr government bond yields
 Description: Current yield on 10-year government bonds
 Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics
 Frequency: Quarterly
 Period: 2000Q1-2013Q1
Variables name: 10-year government bond yield spread (is)
 Description: Di¤erential in the current government bond yield vis-à-vis
the German Bund
 Source: IMF: International Financial statistics and own calculations
 Frequency: Quarterly
 Period: 2000Q1-2013Q1
Variables name: Real GDP
 Description: Real GDP expressed in national currency units; seasonally
adjusted
 Source: OECD: Main Economic Indicators
 Frequency: Quarterly
 Period: 2000Q1-2013Q3
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Variables name: Real GDP growth
 Description: Percentage change of real GDP
 Source: IMF: World Economic Outlook
 Frequency: Annual
 Period: 2007-2012
Variables name: Budget decit/GDP ratio
 Description: General government primary net lending/borrowing to
GDP ratio
 Source: IMF: World Economic Outlook
 Frequency: Annual
 Period: 2000-2012
Variables name: Debt/GDP ratio
 Description: General government gross debt to GDP ratio
 Source: IMF: World Economic Outlook
 Frequency: Annual
 Period: 2000-2012
Variables name: Tax revenues
 Description: Total general government revenues
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 Source: Eurostat
 Frequency: Annual
 Period: 1996-2012
Variables name: De facto scal space
 Description: Ratio of government consolidated gross debt to (four
years) average tax revenues
 Source: Eurostat and own calculations
 Frequency: Quarterly
 Period: 2000Q1-2013Q1
Variables name: Fiscal space di¤erential (dfs)
 Description: Fiscal space di¤erential over Germany
 Source: Eurostat and own calculations
 Frequency: Quarterly
 Period: 2000Q1-2013Q1
Variables name: Bond market liquidity (liq)
 Description: Ratio of a countrys outstanding general government debt
to euro-area-wide total (EU 27)
 Source: Eurostat and own calculations
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 Frequency: Quarterly
 Period: 2000Q1-2013Q1
Variables name: US corporate bond spread (cbs)
 Description: Di¤erential between US AAA Corporate Bond Yields and
US 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis, Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System, and own calculations.
 Frequency: Quarterly
 Period: 2000Q1-2013Q1
Appendix C A Simple Model of Exit and Contagion
in Monetary Unions
Our model uses a multi-country setting consisting of a three-country mone-
tary union and the rest of the world. The union is taken to be asymmetric
and partitioned in two peripheryeconomies or non-corecountries (A and
B) - with identical structural parameters, to simplify modelling - and a core
or leader country. Under xed price and a zero ination rate, the macroeco-
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nomic structure can be summarized by the following set of equations:18
$it =
 
yit   yi
2
+ i
 
sit   si
2
+ Ci (C.1)
yit = i(s
i
t   si) + yi;Ft (C.2)
yi;Ft  D + i(si   sjt   sW )  uit i; j 2 fA;Bg i 6= j ; (C.3)
where all variables are measured in logs and $ = welfare loss, C = opting
out cost, y = real output, y = output target, s = nominal (shadow) exchange
rate, s = entry currency parity, sW = world exchange rate, D = autonomous
component of aggregate demand, u = random shock.
Equation (C.1) is a standard social loss function with an additional linear
term (C) measuring the cost of opting out of the union, where  = 1 if
sit  sit   si 6= 0, and  = 0 if sit = 0. Equation (C.2) gives equilibrium
output in the goods market of country i, where (si   sjt   sW ) is the real
exchange rate dened as a trade-weighted variable with weight  for country
j,  for the core or leader country, and  = 1       for the rest of the
world. Equation (C.3) gives the output for country i required to stay in the
monetary union, where uit is an i.i.d. random (demand) shock characterized
by a continuous, bell-shaped and symmetric (around zero) probability density
function.
18Similar theoretical structures are also found, e.g., in Masson (1999), Buiter, Corsetti,
and Pesenti (2001), Berger and Wagner (2005).
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Model solution yields the optimal switching conditions
sit   si =  
i
2i + 
i

yi;Ft   yi

; (C.4)
uit =
 
2i + 
i

Ci
i
+D + i
 
si   sjt   sW
  yi; i; j 2 fA;Bg i 6= j:
(C.5)
(C.4) is equation (1) in the text. (C.5) computes the threshold value of the
shock (uit) at which the policymaker is indi¤erent between opting out and
remaining in the union, where Ci 
q
Ci
2i+
i is the critical devaluation rate
such that the welfare losses arising from alternative regimes are exactly the
same. It states that if uit  uit it is optimal for country i to stay in; on
the contrary, if uit > u
i
t it is optimal to exit and implement an independent
monetary policy, carrying out a devaluation of size sit   si.
Under rational expectations, equilibrium requires
it = Prt

uit+1 > u
i
t+1

= Prt
 
sit+1   si

> Ci

;
or
it = 1 G
 
uit+1
 sit+1 = sit + i)    it; ft ; (C.6)
where it is the exit probability for country i formed at time t for period t+1,
G () is the cumulative distribution function of uit, i the expected devaluation
rate following the opting out decision, and ft the state of fundamentals at
time t.
The mutual interdependence of private agentsexpectations in di¤erent
countries implies that we can express it as
44
it = 
j
t

1 G  uit+1 sjt+1 = sjt + j)
+
 
1  jt
 
1 G  uit+1 sjt+1 = sjt)  	  it; jt ; ft ; (C.7)
where jt is the expected probability of exit in country j, and 
j the size of
country js devaluation conditional on exit from the currency union. Equa-
tion (C.7) shows that private agents compute it as a weighted average of two
conditional probabilities: the probability that country j exits and devalues
and the probability that j continues to remain in the union next period. As
both sides of (C.7) are increasing with it multiple equilibria can arise as
in the second generation models by Obstfeld (1996), Velasco (1996), Jeanne
(1997), Jeanne and Masson (2000).
Equation (C.7) shows the three main channels for contagion of the shocks.
Monsoonal e¤ectsresult from changes in sW , or D; spillover e¤ectsfrom
changes in jt ; pure contagion from self-fullling expectations of an exit
of country i. The possibility of contagion is also related to changes in exit
expectations for country j. This follows from
@it
@jt
= G
 
uit+1
 sjt+1 = sjt) G  uit+1 sjt+1 = sjt + j) > 0 ; (C.8)
which is equation (2) in the text. It implies that a rise in jt can push the exit
probability in country i high enough that an opting out choice can hardly
be avoided. Fear of a crisis and exit in one country can spread in the other
country, making the opting out choice more likely to occur.
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